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FIXING ESG:
ARE MANDATORY ESG DISCLOSURES THE
SOLUTION TO MISLEADING ESG RATINGS?
Javier El-Hage*
ABSTRACT
This Note provides an overview of the debate around the current
state of ESG disclosure practices, and the perceived need for the
SEC to establish a system of mandatory ESG disclosures. Part I
explores the inherent difficulty of defining ESG, the problematic
nature of quantifying and measuring ESG factors, and the tools
currently being used by market-leading ratings firms and investment
vehicles. In particular, this part addresses the inconsistencies of ESG
self-reporting, the influence of this practice on the ensuing ratings,
and the potential for investors to be misled as a result.
Part II of the Note explores the possible consequences of a system of
mandatory ESG disclosure, weighing the main arguments in favor
and against the establishment of a regulation that mandates ESG
disclosures. Drawing from a 2018 SEC submission by the law
professors Cynthia A. Williams and Jill E. Fisch, Part II explores the
arguments around general market efficiency, U.S. capital markets
competitiveness, and the ultimate goal of giving investors access to
better, more consistent, and fairly comparable information, while
keeping the costs of increased reporting outweighed by the benefits
of it.
Part III closes by describing current proposals in favor of mandating
ESG disclosures. In particular, the Note presents the proposal by
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Professor Fisch, under which the SEC may mandate a discussion on
ESG, while allowing companies the flexibility to decide what factors
to address and how to address them in view of materiality
considerations for their specific industries.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing economic crisis are bringing
increased attention to the already hot topic of Environmental, Social,
and Governance (“ESG”) investing.1 As ESG disclosure initiatives and
metrics have gained popularity in the functioning of capital markets
worldwide, the United States faces a regulatory dilemma.2 Should the
U.S. Congress or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
make broad ESG disclosures mandatory, or will specific climate changerelated disclosure guidelines under Regulation S-K continue to be the
norm?3 The argument for mandating some form of broad ESG
disclosure is manifold, but centers chiefly on the increasingly pervasive
reality of ESG-influenced capital markets, as well as the need to
promote accuracy and market-efficient standardization as an alternative
1. See, e.g., Laurence Fink, Larry Fink’s Chairman’s Letter to Shareholders,
BLACKROCK (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/larry-fink-chairmans-letter [https://perma.cc/5NTG-5NGZ] (“[T]he pandemic
we’re experiencing now highlights the fragility of the globalized world and the value of
sustainable portfolios. We’ve seen sustainable portfolios deliver stronger performance
than traditional portfolios during this period.”); Kristin Broughton & Maitane Sardon,
Coronavirus Pandemic Could Elevate ESG Factors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/coronavirus-pandemic-could-elevate-esg-factors11585167518 [https://perma.cc/N4EJ-EKL5]; see also Coronavirus Pandemic Will
Drive Responsible (ESG) Investing “Skywards,” MONDOVISIONE (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/coronavirus-pandemic-will-driveresponsible-esg-investing-skywards-nigel-gr
[https://perma.cc/AC8X-TCQF]
[hereinafter Driving ESG Skywards]; Nick Marsh, The $30 Trillion Trend That’s Bigger
Than the Entire U.S. Stock Market, OILPRICE (May 05, 2020), https://oilprice.com/
Energy/Energy-General/The-30-Trillion-Trend-Thats-Bigger-Than-The-Entire-USStock-Market.html [https://perma.cc/M72B-23M8] (“While COVID-19 is trouncing
traditional investment themes, sustainable investing—already a $30-trillion mega
trend—is calling all the shots.”).
2. See CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS & JILL E. FISCH, REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING ON
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) DISCLOSURE 1, 8 (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW4JYFEG].
3. See Apostolos Gkoutzinis et al., The SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize
and Enhance MD&A and Other Financial Disclosures, MILBANK 3 (Nov. 30, 2020),
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/4/v4/144237/SEC-Adopts-Amendmentsto-Modernize-and-Enhance-MDA.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CL5-7TCM] (“[T]he SEC
stated that it has declined to add any requirements relating to [ESG] and sustainability
matters, citing its principles-based approach to the MD&A . . . in line with the SEC’s
past guidance set forth in the Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to
Climate Change.”).
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to the currently costly and unreliable market-driven self-regulated ESG
ratings system.4
Those against mandatory disclosure indicate skepticism that it will
be able to fix the underlying difficulties that, for example, make current
ESG ratings unreliable and inefficient. Instead, they assert that
mandatory disclosure would have the unintended effect of increasing
costs of doing business across the board, and even of devaluing the
significance of any material industry-specific and company-specific
required disclosures.5 They further assert that mandatory disclosure will
further increase the prospect of costly plaintiff-driven securities fraud
litigation.
This paper provides an overview of this debate. Part I of the paper
describes the problematic nature of ESG tools currently being used by
the market-dominant investment vehicles. Part II weighs the main
arguments in favor and against mandatory disclosure regulation as a way
to fix these problems. And Part III describes current proposals in favor
of an incremental mandatory disclosure system.6

4. For recent explanations of the policy dilemma, see Peter Rasmussen, Analysis:
Will Investors Get the ESG Data They Want in 2021?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 16,
2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-will-investorsget-the-esg-data-they-want-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/WYF7-S9CZ] (“A January SEC
interpretive release, addressing the disclosure of key performance indicators and
metrics in MD&A, stated in a footnote that the climate change guidance does apply to
ESG metrics such as the employee turnover rate, workforce factors, total energy
consumed, and data security measures.”). See also Stacey H. Mitchell et al., Biden’s
“Money Cop” to Shine a Light on ESG Disclosure as SEC Requirements—and a
Potential Universal Reporting Framework—Appear Imminent, AKIN GUMP (Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/sPBE72pXuuZC6oQirkB3iA/2kqc2e/bidensmoney-cop-to-shine-a-light-on-esg-disclosure-as-sec-requirements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65TH-H4JX] (“With respect to the E category, such requirements
would not require legislation and could take the form of an expansion to the
Commission’s 2010 [Guidance] or, more likely, a new rulemaking (e.g., another
‘modernization’ of Regulation S-K or an entirely new rule altogether).”).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107
GEO. L.J. 923 (2019).
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT VOLUNTARY ESG DISCLOSURES
AND MARKET-DRIVEN RATINGS
There are several problems with the current approach to making
ESG disclosures. This section lays out the inherent problems in defining
ESG; how inconsistently defined ESG factors lead to problematic ESG
ratings; and the problems caused by the current framework of voluntary
disclosures and inconsistent methodologies.
A. DEFINING ESG
The first difficulty presented by the current role of ESG factors in
capital markets and corporate governance is defining which ones they
are and what exactly they are attempting to indicate or measure.7
Broadly speaking, in addition to corporate governance (which stands for
the “G” in ESG), ESG factors typically include a wide range of issues
that are not part of traditional financial analysis, but may still have
investment relevance or materiality.8 These factors may cover discrete
aspects such as “how corporations respond to climate change,” how well
they manage their water use, whether their supply chains fall short of
international human rights standards, how they treat their labor force,
and whether they have a corporate culture that fosters innovation.9
Very importantly, most information that is currently factored into
ESG analysis largely comes from companies’ voluntary disclosures or
survey responses to rating firms’ questionnaires.10 The market for ESG
definitions and standards is heavily influenced by four market-leading
rating companies that compete among themselves to provide ESG
metrics: MSCI ESG, Sustainalytics, RepRisk, and ISS. 11 Together, these
7. See generally TIMOTHY M. DOYLE, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAP. FORMATION,
RATINGS THAT DON’T RATE: THE SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF ESG RATINGS AGENCIES 1
(2018).
8. See Georg Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg
[https://perma.cc/J7DW-ARPX].
9. Id. (“The term ESG was first coined in 2005 in a landmark study entitled ‘Who
Cares Wins.’ Today, ESG investing is estimated at over $20 trillion in AUM or around
a quarter of all professionally managed assets around the world.”).
10. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 13.
11. See id. at 7; see also Billy Nauman, Credit Rating Agencies Join Battle for ESG
Supremacy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/59f60306-d67111e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 [https://perma.cc/42FU-X8JZ] (“Now Moody’s and S&P
Global, two of the big three credit rating agencies, are elbowing their way in, offering
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companies rate over 100,000 companies across dozens of industries and
sectors and also rate more than 400,000 equity and fixed-income
securities.12 They are said to heavily influence the market for ESG
ratings because they are consistently chosen by the world’s leading
investment vehicles, namely BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors,
and others.13
Not only the methodology, but also the quantity and quality of data
factors that each of these four firms employ, are disparate. As analyzed
by Timothy M. Doyle from the American Council for Capital Formation
(ACCF) in a groundbreaking 2018 report:
[E]ach rating agency has a customized scoring method which
evaluates different non-financial metrics and frequently disagree
about the components of ESG . . . . Core ESG metrics vary from as
few as 12 performance indicators to as many as 1,000 for other
agencies.14

MSCI, for example, “evaluates 37 key ESG issues divided into
three pillars (environmental, social, and governance) and ten themes
(climate change, natural resources, pollution & waste, environmental
opportunities, human capital, product liability, stakeholder opposition,
social opportunities, corporate governance, and corporate behavior).”15
Alternatively, Sustainalytics examines a minimum of 70 ESG indicators
in each industry, and breaks them down into “three distinct dimensions:
preparedness, disclosure, and performance.”16
RepRisk, on the other hand, intertwines ESG issues—including
environment, community relations, employee relations, and corporate
governance—with the Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact.17
RepRisk also measures ESG risk exposure using twenty-eight ESG

separate ESG scores on companies in addition to their traditional assessments of
creditworthiness.”).
12. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 7–8.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 8; see also Timothy Doyle, The Big Problem With “Environmental,
Social and Governance” Investment Ratings? They’re Subjective, INVS. BUS. DAILY
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/the-big-problem-withenvironmental-social-and-governance-investment-ratings-theyre-subjective
[https://perma.cc/NT4R-24JN].
15. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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issues and forty-five “hot topics.”18 Finally, the ISS E&S Quality Score
evaluates more than 380 factors, with “at least 240 for each industry
group, divided into environmental and social factors . . . includ[ing]
management of environmental risks and opportunities, human rights,
waste and toxicity, and product safety, quality, and brand.”19 These
distinctive approaches may still provide useful broad signals to the
market, but they lead to significant differences in results, and this, as
discussed below, undermines the quality of information the market is
relying on when making sustainable investment decisions.20
Compounding the problem, ESG rating agencies do not fully
disclose their methodologies or the material impact of selected
indicators, likely as a result of overprotectiveness of their proprietary
methodologies.21 This, in turn, leads to an overall lack of transparency
over ratings and the inexistence of rating firm-prompted agreements on
best practices.22
B. CURRENT USE OF INCONSISTENTLY DEFINED ESG FACTORS
ESG factors are used primarily in three ways: traditional investing,
sustainable investing, and investment stewardship.23 ESG integration in
traditional investing consists of the introduction of ESG factors into
traditional financial analysis to account for risks that may diminish a
company’s long-term valuation; for instance, regulatory action due to
environmental violations.24
Sustainable investing is the “explicit incorporation of ESG
objectives into investment products and strategies,” including
maximizing exposure to companies with high ESG ratings to increase a
fund’s average ESG score.25 More narrowly, it can mean focusing on

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
See infra Section I.C.
See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 8 (quoting Michael Sadowski et al., Rate the
Raters Phase Three Uncovering Best Practices, SustainAbility (Feb. 2011)).
22. Sakis Kotsantonis & George Serafeim, Four Things No One Will Tell You
About ESG Data, 31 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 50, 58 (2019).
23. Barbara Novick et al., Exploring ESG: A Practitioner’s Perspective,
BLACKROCK 1, 2 (2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/
viewpoint-exploring-esg-a-practitioners-perspective-june-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/592G-8T4S].
24. See id.
25. Id.
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companies with low carbon emissions, or screening out companies with
significant labor violations.26
Finally, investment stewardship is a synonym for corporate
governance.27 It typically involves the leading proxy advisory firms
engaging with companies as shareholders in an attempt to enhance the
value of investments, or, increasingly, promote what they consider to be
the right public policy.28 This takes place through dialogue with officers
and proxy voting “to build a mutual understanding of the material risks
facing companies and the expectations of management to mitigate these
risks . . . and to encourag[e] sustainable financial performance over the
long-term.”29
Considering that asset management leaders like BlackRock,30
Vanguard Asset Management,31 Charles Schwab,32 State Street Global

26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id. In practice, this means that shareholder proxy leading firms, such as
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. “will make voting
recommendations based on ESG positions taken by a company.” Dennis T. Whalen, It’s
Time to Reassess ESG and Sustainability Reporting, NACD BOARDTALK (Oct. 28,
2019),
https://blog.nacdonline.org/posts/reassess-sustainability-reporting
[https://
perma.cc/6FMS-QLEW]. But cf. Neil Whoriskey, The New Civil Code: ISS and Glass
Lewis
as
Lawmakers, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July
28,
2020),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/07/28/cleary-gottlieb-discusses-the-newcivil-code-of-iss-and-glass-lewis [https://perma.cc/J66W-N384] (“ISS and Glass Lewis
have arrogated to themselves the power to make law, promulgating a civil code of
astounding breadth and detail . . . and, increasingly, ESG policies ranging from animal
welfare to climate change, diversity, data security and political activities.”).
29. Novick et al., supra note 23. For examples of investments of the second and
third type, see Amin Rajan, Enlightened ESG Investors Engage, But Retain Right to
Divest, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/3b10c36c-eb80-4971aa74-10a8079fc3e7 [https://perma.cc/PU9V-QUP7]. See also Michelle Scrimgeour,
Index Investors Should Not Be Passive Owners When It Comes To ESG, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2019), https://amp-ft-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/amp.ft.com/content/
210a6c79-2be4-47f0-a99c-aa4b821d0330 [https://perma.cc/E97Z-JCJK].
30. Novick et al., supra note 23.
31. See generally ESG investing: Discover funds that reflect what matters most to
you, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/esg/ [https://perma.cc/8C6C4XFG] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
32. Socially Responsible ETFs, CHARLES SCHWAB, https://www.schwab.com/etfs/
types/socially-responsible-etfs [https://perma.cc/V8NP-SLB4] (last visited Aug. 20,
2021).
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Advisors,33 Fidelity Investments,34 and BNY Mellon Investment
Management35 each pursue a combination of these three forms of ESG
investing and corporate governance advocacy, their actions or failures to
act may significantly shape the functioning of both capital markets and
corporate boardrooms.36
Over the last 25 years, in addition to the market-dominating rating
firms, over 100 ESG standard-setting initiatives have emerged, causing
“option overload” for companies.37 These include the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Climate Disclosure
Standards Board (CDSB), which have jointly created the influential38
Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD), as well as
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP), among others.39 These initiatives, while well-intentioned,
contribute to poor market-wide communication and lack of
transparency.40
Despite efforts at streamlining disclosures,41 the overcrowding of
initiatives continues to make the market for suggested methods and

33. Our ESG Solutions, STATE STREET, http://www.statestreet.com/solutions/bycapability/esg.html [https://perma.cc/24DD-B6DK] (last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
34. Fidelity U.S. Sustainable Index Fund, FIDELITY, https://fundresearch.
fidelity.com/mutual-funds/summary/31635V398 [https://perma.cc/W4V9-85GM] (last
visited Aug. 20, 2021).
35. ESG Analytics, BNY MELLON, https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/what-wedo/investment-services/asset-servicing/esg-analytics.jsp [https://perma.cc/8XFF-BAPX]
(last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
36. Edward Helmore, Wall Street Investment Giants Voting Against Key Climate
Resolutions, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2019/sep/17/wall-street-asset-management-climate-change-blackrock-vanguard
[https://perma.cc/N9BA-YE63].
37. Whalen, supra note 28; see WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 9 (“Over the
last twenty-five years, voluntary disclosure of ESG information, and voluntary
frameworks for that disclosure, have proliferated to meet the demands for information
from investors, consumers, and civil society.”).
38. Id. at 12–14.
39. Whalen, supra note 28.
40. WORLD ECON. F., SEEKING RETURN ON ESG: ADVANCING THE REPORTING
ECOSYSTEM TO UNLOCK IMPACT FOR BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 1, 18 (2019),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ESG_Report_digital_pages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9VG4-5D42].
41. NASDAQ, ESG REPORTING GUIDE 2.0: A SUPPORT RESOURCE FOR COMPANIES 1,
13 (2019) (“Divergent metrics have been streamlined, as have divergent ESG reporting
frameworks . . . Nasdaq even narrowed the list of 33 ESG metrics in the previous
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purposes for ESG disclosures confusing for investors.42 This
inconsistency, combined with the powerful moral rhetoric behind ESG
advocacy, has led SEC commissioner Hester M. Peirce to liken ESG
ratings to “scarlet letter[s] . . . we see labeling based on incomplete
information, public shaming, and shunning wrapped in moral rhetoric
preached with cold-hearted, self-righteous oblivion to the consequences,
which ultimately fall on real people.”43
C. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES AND
INCONSISTENT METHODOLOGIES
The fact that ESG ratings are driven largely by inconsistent data
providers—typically rating firms—creates practical problems for the
operation of market actors, including investors and issuers, all of which
affect the integrity and efficiency of global capital markets.
1. Inconsistent Methodology Leads to Different Data Being Sought
From the Same Company Leading to Different Results
The lack of standardization among ratings firms—or market data
providers—can be confusing for companies and misleading for capital
market actors as company ESG scores frequently vary across rating
firms.44
Research conducted by Florian Berg of the MIT Sloan School of
Management, shows ESG ratings from different sources are aligned in
only about 6 out of 10 cases, compared to creditworthiness ratings,
which match 99% of the time.45 Similarly, Doyle’s research for the
version to just 30 in this one . . . to focus more effort on . . . the most . . . achievable
ones.”).
42. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 9–10 (“By 2017, 83% of the top 100
companies in the Americas published a corporate responsibility report, as do 77% of
top 100 companies in Europe and 78% in Asia. Of the largest 250 companies globally,
reporting rates are 93%.”).
43. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r., SEC, Scarlet Letters: Remarks Before the
American Enterprise Institute (June 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speech-peirce-061819 [https://perma.cc/W76C-BKTQ].
44. See Kotsantonis & Serafeim, supra note 22, at 57 (“In discussing the methods
they use to assess a company’s performance, data providers should include not only a
list of material issues and a description of their scoring methodology, but more detail on
the peer groups used, and clearly distinguishing between real and imputed data.”).
45. Nauman, supra note 11.
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ACCF, citing CSRHub, shows that ESG rating agencies frequently
disagree even when evaluating the same company.46 “When comparing
MSCI’s and Sustainalytics’ ratings for companies in the S&P Global
1200 index, CSRHub found a weak correlation (0.32) between the two
firms’ ratings.”47
As Doyle has pointed out, “[r]ating agencies in other capital
markets are much more closely aligned.”48 For example, “Moody’s and
S&P’s credit ratings have a very strong positive correlation (0.90).”49
The main difference between credit ratings and ESG ratings is attributed
to the fact that credit ratings use consistent information, in the form of
standardized financial disclosures, while ESG ratings do not.50
2. Whether Self-Serving or Not, Current Disclosures Can Mislead the
Market
Most ESG data ultimately used by rating firms and other ESG
factor integrating institutions is voluntarily reported by the companies
being rated. The reporting occurs through the publication of annual
sustainability reports or through informal responses to voluntary surveys
driven largely by rating firms.51 This way, voluntary reporting allows for
near complete customization of style, format and content of
disclosures,52 and “provides ample room for companies to manipulate
the disclosure process.”53 Unlike financial statements used for
investment analysis, these ESG disclosures are unaudited, which creates
further incentives for companies to try to adjust favorably to rating
methodologies and to consequently always put the company in a good
light.54
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

DOYLE, supra note 7, at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
SOL KWON, INV. RESP. RSCH. CTR. INST., STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND
INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018 5 (Heidi Welsh et al. eds., 2018),
https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2018/11/2018-SP-500Integrated-Reporting-FINAL-November-2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ7J-JSM9].
53. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 9 (“According to the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board, roughly 75% of the information reported in sustainability reports is
already addressed by issuers in their SEC filings. However, 90% of known negative
events are not disclosed in either the SEC filings or sustainability reports.”).
54. See id.
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The Doyle report provides an example of the limitations of
voluntary disclosure with the case of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company.55 Sustainalytics gave the tire company a higher score than
industry standard, presumably on account of the comprehensiveness of
the information they disclosed, despite being a company “fraught with
ESG issues and exposure, such as asbestos-related claims, various
OSHA fines, and litigation settlements.”56
The ACCF report also highlights inconsistent ratings by RepRisk
and Sustainalytics over Bank of America (“BofA”), which has high
exposure to ESG-related risks involving business ethics, including
exposure to litigation, suspicion over mortgage-backed securities
scandals, and a political loan scandal involving Countrywide Financial. 57
While both rating firms factored in the same issues, they produced
“dramatically different [scores] due to inconsistencies in how the ratings
providers interpreted these issues.”58
Whether voluntary disclosures are self-serving or merely
idiosyncratic, the data processing and ultimately the scores produced by
the different rating agencies show a similar degree of inconsistency that
can mislead investors and materially affect investment decisions.59
Moreover, companies lack consistent benchmarks necessary to properly
measure “peer groups” for meaningful comparison, and to encourage
measurable improvement.60
3. Ratings Biases
Beyond the lack of consistency resulting from both the
methodology used by rating firms and the quality of information being
reported by companies, the ACCF report has identified and carefully
documented three kinds of biases across ratings methodologies.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 14 (“In addition to inconsistencies in how various issues are
interpreted by ratings agencies, differing methodologies only compound the lack of
clarity for investors. Without standardized grading methodologies, these scores may
lead investors in different directions and certainly cause confusion if compared.”).
60. Kotsantonis & Serafeim, supra note 22, at 53–54.
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a. Size Bias
Regarding size bias, ESG ratings by Sustainalytics show that larger
companies tend to obtain better ESG ratings.61 The ACCF report used a
sample size of over 4,000 companies, and the result suggested that the
larger companies’ ability to devote more resources to preparing nonfinancial disclosures is the key factor leading to higher ratings.62 MSCI
addressed a similar “imbalance indicating that ‘[c]ompanies with higher
valuations might be in better financial shape and therefore able to invest
more in measures that improve their ESG profile; such investments
might lead to higher ESG scores.’”63 As a result, according to the ACCF
report, small and mid-sized companies would seem to be “at a
competitive disadvantage” in ESG ratings, even when these companies
may “create the most jobs and tend to be the most innovative.”64
For example, as cited by the ACCF report, the Bristol-Myers
Squibb (“BMS”) pharmaceutical company has an $83 billion market
capitalization and a Sustainalytics ratings score of 73, which is 20 points
better than the healthcare industry average and 25 points above the
overall Sustainalytics average.65 The company has been involved in
high-profile controversies including “questionable experimental testing
methods and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations,” but as a high
market cap company, it “implements GRI Sustainability Reporting
Standards and has established high-profile ESG goals,”66 which account
for its high ESG ratings.
The ACCF report then compared BMS with the performance of
Phibro Animal Health, a smaller pharmaceutical company operating “as
a diversified animal health and mineral nutrition” organization. 67
Despite its comparatively small $1.7 billion market capitalization,
“Phibro employs over 1,400 professionals and ‘has a responsibility to
deliver safe, effective, sustainable products and to provide expert

61.
62.
63.

DOYLE, supra note 7, at 9–10.
See id.
Id. at 9 (quoting Guido Giese et al., Foundations of ESG Investing: How ESG
Affects Equity Valuation, Risk, and Performance, 45 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 1, 2 (2017),
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/03d6faef-2394-44e9-a119-4ca130909226
[https://perma.cc/5C4B-FZQ2]).
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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guidance about their use.’”68 Phibro also “runs the educational website
animalantibiotics.org [that] engage[s] stakeholders about animal health
issues, including responsible antibiotic use and resistance.”69 Despite its
mission statement-based track record and operational alignment with
ESG concerns, Phibro has a Sustainalytics score of only 46, “which is 3
points worse than the healthcare industry average and 8 points below the
overall Sustainalytics average.”70 “Instead of providing transparency,
[size] bias shows how such ratings systems are not only subjective, but
can also leave investors in the dark about the actual strength of a
company’s ESG practices.”71
MSCI, one of the rating firms, has responded to this alleged size
bias—namely, that “small-cap stocks have low ESG ratings”—calling it
a “myth [that] stems from the early years of ESG research when larger
companies were better able to disclose ESG-related data compared to
smaller ones.”72 According to the company, their research now shows
that this “reporting bias was mitigated due to more disclosures by midcap companies, as well as enhancements made to the MSCI ESG
Ratings model.”73
b. Geography Bias
Comparing ESG ratings across geographies in a global market is
difficult for several reasons. The ACCF report, however, has identified a
bias in favor of European companies vis-à-vis North American ones,
which may be based on persuasive reporting and investor sentiment
towards the materiality of ESG reporting, rather than on actual ESG
practices:
A telling example of geographic bias is evident when comparing the
BMW Group and Tesla. BMW has a high rating (93rd percentile)
despite a slew of controversies, including anti-competitive practices,
illegal marketing practices, business ethics violations relating to
68. Id.
(quoting
Responsibility,
PHIBRO
ANIMAL
HEALTH
CORP.,
https://www.pahc.com/responsibility [https://perma.cc/26SU-6M36]).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Guillermo Cano, Factors and ESG: The Truth Behind Three Myths, MSCI
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/factors-and-esg-the-truth/
01291000034 [https://perma.cc/8EQA-CMA3].
73. Id.
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intellectual property, employee and human rights violations along
their supply chain, and even animal rights violations. The company
is facing accusations of collusion with Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche,
and Daimler on various technological issues and systems to evade
environmental and safety regulations.
In contrast, Tesla (38th percentile) is below every single European
auto manufacturer, including the companies named in the collusion
accusations above. Most notably, Tesla’s score even lags
Volkswagen, which . . . has been implicated in a major
environmental violation. Meanwhile, Tesla is the world leader in
technology to reduce carbon emissions from automobiles.74

According to the ACCF report, if we consider the conspicuous
environmental and ethical violations committed by BMW and other
European automakers,75 their comparison in ratings performance with
Tesla strongly suggests that their “score is more a reflection of the
amount of information disclosed—a requirement in Europe—than a
company’s adherence to ESG practices.”76
c. Industry Sector Bias
Also following the ACCF report, ratings agencies seem to assign E,
S, and G weights to companies without correctly factoring in companyspecific risks, despite their stated objective to “normalize” ratings by
industry.77 While it is important to establish industry benchmarks in an
attempt to standardize disclosures and metrics within an industry,
industry-weighting standardization may also bias ratings and be
misleading to investors:
One example of unbalanced industry exposure is iShares MSCI KLD
400 Social ETF, the largest ESG focused ETF fund. Currently the
fund invests heavily in information technology companies. In fact,
information technology investments account for 31% of the $1

74. See DOYLE, supra note 7, at 10–11 (“In Europe, the EU requires companies
with 500 employees or more to publish a ‘non-financial statement’ as well as additional
disclosures around diversity policy. North America has no such requirement for
disclosure, which is one source for the positive bias toward European companies.”).
75. See Alex Gibney, Dirty Money: Hard NOX, NETFLIX (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.netflix.com/watch.
76. DOYLE, supra note 7, at 11.
77. Id.
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trillion in assets under management, with the top three investments
being Microsoft, Facebook, and Google.78

The ACCF report suggests that, while common for ESG ratings,
categorizing all companies similarly within each industry, underlines the
“need for a more tailored approach to the ratings process.”79 For
example:
In its own evaluation of ESG investing, MSCI acknowledges that
company-specific risks are not a focus and the systematic issues that
face a given industry play a more important role: ‘In essence, the
MSCI ESG Rating is a reflection of companies’ residual risk
exposure to their industry’s most significant key issues after taking
into account companies’ risk-mitigation techniques.’80

4. Failure to Identify Risk
The methodological inconsistencies and biases identified above in
the ACCF report are magnified when scandals representing the
materialization of risks resulting from poor corporate governance or
intentional damage to the environment fail to substantially affect a
company’s high ratings. In September 2015, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) found that Volkswagen was guilty of
intentionally using a “defeat device” to circumvent official emissionstesting software, effectively causing 11 million vehicles worldwide
produced from 2009 to 2015 to pollute at a much higher rate than
advertised.81 The company was sanctioned with more than $25 billion in
fines and penalties to account for one of the worst violations of the
Clean Air Act by a corporation ever.82
Despite this, Volkswagen continued to have an “ESG rating higher
than its peer average. The ratings dropped from well above average at

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id. (quoting Giese et al., supra note 63).
See id. at 11–12; see also GIBNEY, supra note 75; Jack Ewing, Volkswagen
Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in Diesel Deception, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/international/volkswagendiesel-car-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/H6N8-TLG5].
82. See Roger Parloff, How VW Paid $25 Billion for “Dieselgate”—and Got Off
Easy, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-vw-paid-25billion-for-dieselgate-and-got-off-easy [https://perma.cc/ZW8M-ZBXP].
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77 to still 6 points above average at 66 following the scandal becoming
public.”83 According to the ACCF report, “[t]his example is concerning
because it shows a complete failure by the ratings agencies to accurately
capture ESG risk, even after a blatant attempt at bypassing
environmental regulations.”84 The report continues to state that while
this arguably constituted clear environmental and corporate governance
failures, “the subjectivity and biases inherent to ESG ratings ensure[d]
that ratings agencies [were] either unable or unwilling to both identify
risk and properly protect investors from mismanagement.”85
5. Overall Insufficiency
Given this myriad of problems with the quality of voluntary ESG
disclosures and ratings, large asset managers like Blackrock and
important industry players like Bloomberg have publicly expressed their
discontent. Blackrock has asserted that current reporting practices are
insufficient for the kinds of in-depth investment analysis that it seeks
with its ESG integration, making it “difficult to identify investment
decision-useful data.”86
Similarly, in 2016, Bloomberg, a company that sells capital markets
data, reached conclusions similar to those of BlackRock about the
quality of ESG data. Even though Bloomberg has incorporated ESG
factors into the data that it sells to dealers, brokers, and investors around
the world, its CEO Michael Bloomberg said that “[f]or the most part, the
sustainability information that is disclosed by corporations today is not
useful for investors or other decision-makers . . . .”87
The current situation of voluntary ESG disclosures and marketdriven ratings is full of problems, throwing its usefulness into question.
Part II below lays out the arguments in favor of and against making
disclosures mandatory, potentially resolving these issues.
83.
84.
85.
86.

DOYLE, supra note 7, at 16.
Id.
Id.
See Novick et al., supra note 23, at 4.
In our experience, current corporate sustainability reporting often includes
disclosure about factors that, while honorable, are less relevant to investment
decision making (e.g., corporate philanthropy). As a result, current reporting
practices may make it difficult to identify investment decision-useful data (e.g.,
water usage and risks in the aforementioned beverage company example). Id.

87. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting BLOOMBERG, IMPACT REPORT
UPDATE 2015 2
(2015),
http://www.bbhub.io/sustainability/sites/6/2016/04/
16_0404_Impact_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/84MJ-6BZ5]).

376

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

II. WEIGHING ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MAKING ESG
DISCLOSURES MANDATORY
ESG-factor integration and general use in global capital markets is
growing, and this includes the United States. U.S.-domiciled assets
using sustainable, responsible, and impact investing (“SRI”) strategies
grew from $8.72 trillion in 2016 to $12.0 trillion at the start of 2018. 88
This was a 38% increase, and the amount went from representing 21%
to 26% of the total assets under professional management in the U.S.89
As Williams and Fisch have noted, “[t]hese latter data starkly
contrast with the facts when the SEC last considered the issue of
expanded social and environmental disclosure in comprehensive
fashion, between 1971 and 1975.”90 At the time, “there were two active
‘ethical funds’ in the United States, which by 1975 collectively held
only $18.6 million assets under management, or 0.0005% of mutual
fund assets.”91
The growing importance of ESG factors, in addition to the myriad
of problems with the current system as highlighted in Part I, have led
many market players, including the largest asset managers and rating
firms, as well as some capital markets academics, to call for the SEC to
issue a regulation making at least some form of ESG disclosure
mandatory. “The economically advanced nations of the world are
transitioning toward mandatory broad ESG disclosures, and this is a
transition the United States, however reluctantly, is likely to make in
time.”92
In 2018, the corporate law professors Cynthia A. Williams and Jill
E. Fisch submitted a petition to the SEC advocating in favor of SEC

88. Compare WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 8–9 (providing figures as of
2016), with U.S. SIF FOUND., REPORT ON U.S. SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT
INVESTING TRENDS (2018), https://www.ussif.org/files/2018%20_Trends_OnePager_
Overview(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/ATX7-774M] (providing updated numbers as of late
2018).
89. Id.
90. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 8.
91. Id. (quoting Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1267 (1999)).
92. Leonard W. Wang, Insight: ESG Disclosures—Prospects for the Future,
BLOOMBERG TAX (Aug. 30, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financialaccounting/insight-esg-disclosures-prospects-for-the-future [https://perma.cc/RMG968M3].
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regulations to mandate ESG disclosure.93 The petition further
acknowledged and incorporated the requests by important market
players.94 Below are the main arguments in favor of this ESG disclosure
regulation, as well as the potential drawbacks and arguments against
them.
A. MARKET EFFICIENCY: INVESTORS WILL HAVE BETTER, MORE
CONSISTENT, COMPARABLE INFORMATION
The efficient capital markets hypothesis includes two different
types of efficiency: first, “informational efficiency,” meaning the
existence of “market mechanisms able to process new information
quickly and with broad distribution,” and, second, “allocative
efficiency,” or the ability to “distribut[e] capital resources to their
highest value use at the lowest cost and risk.”95 According to Williams
and Fisch, capital markets are constrained in promoting allocational
efficiency when they do not have “consistent, comparable, reliable, and
complete information.”96
To achieve the second type of efficiency it is key that the
information being quickly transmitted under the first type is in fact
providing reliable signals so that market participants can choose to
allocate capital efficiently.97 As seen in Part I, however, the current ESG
ratings system hardly allows participants to make even reasonably
informed decisions in allocating capital in an ESG-conscious way. For
example, despite the fact that climate change poses both risks and
opportunities to companies in most industries, it is proving very difficult
under the current system for companies to achieve efficiency as they
attempt to “manage the transition to a low-carbon future by supporting
the allocation of capital to its risk-adjusted highest-value use in that
transition.”98
As we have seen above, under the current system of market-driven,
self-regulated, voluntary disclosure, the information produced by
companies and ratings firms is often incomplete, inconsistent, and not
comparable between companies or industries.99 Citing a 2015 paper on
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2.
See id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 10.

378

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

market reactions to mandatory nonfinancial disclosure, Williams and
Fisch suggest that “when ESG disclosure becomes mandatory, standards
become clearer and reporting becomes more consistent and
comparable.”100
B. COMPETITIVENESS FOR CAPITAL FORMATION VIS-À-VIS OTHER
CAPITAL MARKETS
Proponents for mandatory ESG disclosure argue that, by
implementing this regulation, the SEC would be, among other things,
spurring competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and public
companies.101
According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for Responsible
Investment at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government,
more than 20 countries have passed legislation within the last 15 years
to require publicly-traded companies to issue reports that include
environmental and social information.102 Also, seven stock exchanges,
including the London Stock Exchange, now require social and
environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements.”103
To the extent that US companies fail to disclose information which
global investors are being encouraged, and in some cases required, to
consider, they will be at a disadvantage in attracting capital from
some of the world’s largest financial markets. This highlights that
US corporate reporting standards will soon become outdated if they
are not revised to incorporate global developments regarding the
materiality and disclosure of ESG information.104

Williams and Fisch further assert that mandatory disclosure would
promote capital formation. By providing more, and better, information
100. Id. (citing Jody Grewal et al., Market Reaction to Mandatory Nonfinancial
Disclosure 27 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-025, 2015),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2657712 [https://perma.cc/JHF8-D62K] (arguing that
“firms having high ESG disclosure and stronger governance performance will be able
to institute the [EU Directive on non-financial reporting] more efficiently and costeffectively” because the reporting is mandatory, thus creating consistency)).
101. Grewal et al., supra note 100, at 4.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. (noting that the remaining six are ASX, Brazil’s Bovespa, India’s Securities
and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malaysia, Oslo’s Børs, and the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange).
104. Id.

2021]

FIXING ESG DISCLOSURE

379

about risks and opportunities to investors, and by “standardizing what is
currently an uncoordinated and irregular universe of ESG disclosures,”
the SEC would increase confidence in capital markets, a deciding factor
in attracting capital:105
This confidence may well mobilize sources of capital from investors
who are currently unwilling to invest given knowledge gaps or
information asymmetries. Particularly retail investors, who are
important as long-term investors and investors in small and medium
enterprises, may be emboldened by a clearer sense of the social and
environmental aspects of companies’ activities as a guide to
companies’ longer-term risks and opportunities.106

Alongside the discussion about increasing U.S. regulatory
competitiveness with respect to other major capital markets, there is the
potential issue of additional costs for companies to comply with an
additional set of rules. The positions around this issue are laid out
below.
C. BURDEN ON ISSUERS: HIGHER COSTS VS. REDUCED COSTS
In Hong Kong, proposals to make ESG disclosures mandatory have
already triggered mixed responses between those who find they will
unduly and excessively burden companies, and others who are more
open to what they see as an inevitable prospect.107 Similarly, in the
United States, voices have been heard from members of Congress
opposing a bill that would make ESG disclosures mandatory.108

105.
106.
107.

Id. at 5–6.
Id.
Patrick Temple-West, Companies Resist Hong Kong ESG Disclosure Proposal,
FIN. TIMES (Jul. 30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/026ee8f2-b2de-11e9-8cb2799a3a8cf37b [https://perma.cc/S44E-U8MB] (“In May, HKEX proposed forcing listed
companies to publish statements about ESG-related risks. But the Chamber of Hong
Kong Listed Companies, whose members include Tencent and China Mobile, said it
wants the exchange to leave disclosure to the discretion of companies.”).
108. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong.
(2019–2020); see also Patrick Temple-West, U.S. Congress Rejects European-Style
ESG Reporting Standards, FIN. TIMES (Jul. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/
content/0dd92570-a47b-11e9-974c-ad1c6ab5efd1 [https://perma.cc/PTE5-J96R] (“In
interviews with the Financial Times before the hearing, Republicans said they did not
want to hit companies with additional disclosure obligations. Corporate rules for
environmental protection already exist and adding disclosure costs could have a
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Other critics in the United States like the Manhattan Institute, a
libertarian think tank, argue that the “most obvious . . . [danger] in using
government as a tool to enforce [SASB-like ESG] standards” is the cost
burden of increased reporting.109 From the Institute’s view, reporting and
compliance costs, which have already increased in recent years,
ultimately favor larger firms because they already have large legal and
regulatory compliance staffs.110 Similarly, a point has been raised that
publicly-traded corporations have already been falling in number and
that “throwing the government’s weight behind [mandatory ESG
disclosure] risks driving even more companies from America’s publicly
traded stock markets, which have fewer corporate listings today than in
1975.”111
Alongside these risks, however, we may also weigh possible
benefits of more robust ESG disclosures. For example, from a securities
fraud risk perspective, it is in the best interest of all public companies—
large and small—to provide meaningful ESG disclosures, to the extent
they relate to specific factors material to their businesses and industries.
But disclosures that are too general and aspirational in an attempt to
prevent shareholder and SEC lawsuits may end up “frustrating important
stakeholders instead of impressing them.”112 This uncomfortable middle
ground could be preparing companies for the transition to some form of
mandatory disclosure, while allowing them to take the full benefit of
reduced costs of standardization.113 As a result, companies could “be
better prepared for compulsory disclosure rules if and when they are
mandated by the SEC.”114
The fact is that, as discussed above, industry-led standardization
has already been underway over the past few years spurred by stock

negative material financial impact on companies, said Republican representative
Warren Davidson of Ohio.”).
109. Howard Husock & James R. Copland, “Sustainability Standards” Open a
Pandora’s Box of Politically Correct Accounting, INVS. BUS. DAILY (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/sustainability-standards-open-apandoras-box-of-politically-correct-accounting [https://perma.cc/98RU-AYB6].
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Wang, supra note 92.
113. See id.
114. Id.
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exchanges and industry leaders—for example, through the Nasdaq ESG
initiative, and under influential initiatives like the TCFD.115
Moreover, as noted by Williams and Fisch, companies today are
already burdened with meeting investor expectations for sustainability
information even though they lack clear standards on how to do so.
“[B]ecause there isn’t clear guidance . . . different companies are using
different frameworks and multiple mechanisms to disclose sustainability
information.”116 In other words, companies have already been pushed to
heavy burdens of voluntary disclosure, and yet “investors are still
dissatisfied with the comparability of sustainability information, even
between companies in the same industry.”117
Taking this into account, mandatory disclosure regulation could,
instead of increasing it, reduce the cost burden for companies:118
That ESG disclosure requirements could actually reduce burdens on
America’s public companies was well-stated in the CFA Institute’s
Comment Letter to the Concept Release: “Many issuers already
provide lengthy sustainability or ESG reports to their investors, so
many issuers will not face a new and burdensome cost by collecting,
verifying and disclosing ESG information. Costs may be saved if
instead of producing large sustainability reports that cover a broad
range of sustainability information, issuers can instead focus on only
collecting, verifying and disclosing information concerning the
factors that are material to them and their investors.”

The arguments regarding costs seem to be strong on both sides of
the debate. Next, we address the potential for higher litigation risk
emerging from mandatory disclosure regulation.
D. HIGHER RISK OF LITIGATION?
The Manhattan Institute has argued that “[t]he more significant
costs of mandatory SASB-style disclosures, however, are those flowing
115. See WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 9–10; see also Blaine Townsend, The
Case for Standardized, Audited ESG Reporting, ACCT. TODAY (May 15, 2019),
https://www.accountingtoday.com/opinion/the-case-for-standardized-audited-esgreporting [https://perma.cc/2VPN-8MJG].
116. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 12.
117. See id.
118. Id. (quoting CHARTERED FINANCIAL ANALYSIS INSTITUTE, COMMENT LETTER
TO THE CONCEPT RELEASE: BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BY
REGULATION S-K 18–19 (Oct. 06, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0616/s70616-375.pdf [https://perma.cc/PU64-82DQ]).
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from the leverage that such mandated disclosures would necessarily give
to politicized enforcement agents at the SEC and Department of
Justice.”119 For this libertarian think tank, mandatory disclosure would
give excessive power “to politically ambitious state attorneys general,
and to class-action plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking to pounce on alleged
misstatements.”120
This argument, however, fails to acknowledge the fact that,
currently, companies who choose to make voluntary disclosures are
already subject to the risk of anti-fraud securities litigation.121 Moreover,
while companies may still be found liable over misleading climate risk
disclosures, comparative legal analysis suggests that failing to carry out
climate-risk disclosures (a traditional ESG factor) is also likely to
prompt litigation.122
Finally, climate-change litigation occurring under the current
system has the potential to pressure the SEC to act and impose at least
climate-related ESG disclosures.123

119.
120.

Husock & Copland, supra note 109.
Id.
To be sure, state AGs and plaintiffs’ lawyers may be able to harass or sue
companies for voluntary disclosures using old-fashioned tort claims or overly
broad state statutes like New York’s Martin Act securities law. But with a
mandatory SEC disclosure rule, the potential for regulation through litigation or
prosecution outside the normal legislative lawmaking process would be greatly
multiplied.

121. See Jonathan D. Guynn, Insights: Managing Legal Risks for ESG Disclosures
Under U.S. Law, JONES DAY (July 2019), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/
07/managing-legal-risks-for-esg-disclosures-us-law [https://perma.cc/FXX3-L8DK].
122. Robin Hamaker-Taylor et al., Voluntary Climate Disclosures Can Reduce
Litigation Risk, ACCLIMATISE UK (June 13, 2019), http://www.acclimatise.uk.com/
2019/06/13/voluntary-climate-disclosures-can-reduce-litigation-risk [https://perma.cc/
9HU9-QBMV].
123. Wang, supra note 92.
In a landmark 2016 decision captioned Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (D. Ore. 2016), the federal district court in Oregon ruled, that there is a
fundamental right under the Constitution to a climate that would sustain human
life. The novelty of the decision triggered a frenzy of appellate activity that
continues to date.
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E. DESPITE THE RISKS, INVESTORS AND COMPANIES ARE PROREPORTING
A survey from 2014 showed that practically 80% of investors were
dissatisfied with the comparability of ESG reporting between companies
in the same industry.124 In May 2020, an SEC subcommittee
acknowledged this reality, and further recommended the Commission to
require issuers to “directly provide material information to the market
relating to ESG issues used by investors to make investment and voting
decisions.”125 Leonard W. Wang, a former SEC official, has noted that
“as ESG disclosures grow in importance . . . [t]he potential for losses
from inaccurate or fraudulent ESG disclosures will rise.”126
As Wang put it, “[f]raud and deception gravitate toward unguarded
venues, [and so] [i]nvestor losses from ESG disclosure failures could
increase pressure for broad mandatory disclosure requirements.”127
These future losses, according to Wang, “will increase the already
significant pressure for mandatory broad disclosures” because
“[u]ltimately, regulation cannot lag too far behind the market.” 128
Moreover, recent attempts in Europe at increasing mandatory ESG
disclosures provide, in Wang’s view, an example of the global push in
that direction.129
Other industry concerns with the status quo suggest mandatory
disclosure may also serve to reduce potential ethics controversy or
litigation risks, especially to the extent that it will level the playing field.
Blackrock researchers found that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
“ethics controversies are more likely for firms that adopt popular ESG
policies,” as opposed to those that keep their ESG disclosures to a
124.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SUSTAINABILITY GOES MAINSTREAM: INSIGHTS
8 (May 2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investorresource-institute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investorviews.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4FE-QQJ9].
125. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RECOMMENDATION FROM THE INVESTOR-ASOWNER SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE RELATING TO
ESG DISCLOSURE 8 (May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisorycommittee-2012/recommendation-of-the-investor-as-owner-subcommittee-on-esgdisclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAK3-UQP4].
126. Wang, supra note 92.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Insights: Investors’ ESG Demands Drive Regulation, KPMG (May 2019),
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2019/05/investors-esg-demands-driveregulation-fs.html [https://perma.cc/67QT-HKCY].
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minimum.130 Along the same lines, important ESG indexes are said to
“favor companies that disclose more ESG policies and as a consequence
generally have greater controversy exposure than an ESG-unaware
benchmark.”131 Despite the obvious risks, the current mix of incentives
and market practices seems to have made companies generally more
inclined to robust ESG reporting.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTING MANDATED DISCLOSURES
The sensible implementation of any degree of mandatory ESG
disclosures is likely to compound the challenges already presented by
the difficulty of defining ESG and by current market-influenced
practices in ESG reporting. This section sets out to describe some of
these additional challenges and lays out what seem to be the more
sensible proposed solutions.
A. A TASK FOR THE SEC
While some standardization has come about by way of industry-led
initiatives and self-regulation, complete standardization is unlikely short
of disclosures being made mandatory. Both Congress and the SEC have
the ability to mandate such ESG disclosures.132 Though the prospect of
Congressional action was not high under the Trump administration
judging by the reaction when the idea was floated in early 2019, that
animus appears to have changed rapidly under the current Biden
administration.133 In any case, the only legislative initiative currently

130. Gerald T. Garvey et al., A Pitfall in Ethical Investing: ESG Disclosures Reflect
Vulnerabilities, not Virtues, 15 J. INV. MGMT. 1, 2 (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2840629 [https://perma.cc/7KAKJ59F].
131. Id.
132. See Townsend, supra note 115.
133. Compare Temple-West, supra note 108, with Kristin Broughton & Mark
Maurer, Companies Could Face Pressure to Disclose More ESG Data, WALL ST. J.
(DEC. 6, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-could-face-pressure-todisclose-more-esg-data-11607263201 [https://perma.cc/TP8X-SZKD]. See also
Mitchell et al., supra note 4.
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being discussed limits itself to mandating the SEC to “define ESG
metrics.”134
Of the two policymakers, the SEC is more likely to act, whether it
is mandated to do so by an act of Congress such as the ESG disclosure
bill mentioned above, or in implementation of the SEC’s current
regulatory powers, even at the risk of being challenged in court.135 In
2014, the SEC already solicited public comments to its “Disclosure
Effectiveness” initiative, seeking to “evaluate and potentially reform
corporate disclosure requirements.”136 “As part of that initiative, a 2016
Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by
Regulation S-K (“Concept Release”) solicited opinions” from the public
on ESG disclosures.137
Williams and Fisch, who led the submission of the most
authoritative brief advocating for mandatory disclosures, noted that
“[r]equiring firms to disclose more ESG information is . . . consistent
with the SEC’s authority to promote market efficiency, and within its
broad mandate ‘to promulgate rules for registrant disclosure as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.’”138
While as of late November 2020 the SEC had all but ratified its
continued approach of taking small interpretive steps in addition to the
2010 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change, by February 2021 the drumrolls seemed to be announcing
imminent approval of a regulation for broad and mandatory ESG
disclosures.139

134. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong.,
§ 2(a) (2019–2020).
135. Wang, supra note 92 (“The SEC may have doubts about its legal authority to
promulgate broad ESG disclosure standards. It may hesitate because of judicial rulings
against its regulation for conflict minerals disclosure . . . The potential for litigation to
challenge new broad rules may also discourage the SEC.”).
136. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 1.
137. Id.
138. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting Business and Financial
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act Release No. 33-10064, 2016
WL 1458170 (Apr. 13, 2016)).
139. See Rasmussen, supra note 4; Mitchell et al., supra note 4.
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B. MATERIALITY OF ESG DISCLOSURES
The concept of materiality, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court
in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., was also emphasized in Williams
and Fisch’s submission to argue that material disclosures affect the
market in a way that SEC action is required to reduce likelihood of
fraud:140
As the Court said, “[p]ut another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Thus, what is material
depends on reasonable investors’ perceptions of what information is
already available in the market, and how any new or omitted
information changes those perceptions of the quality of management,
when voting or engaging with management, or the value of a
company or its shares, when investing or selling.141

The catastrophic economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic,
and the avalanche of securities fraud litigation that is likely to arise from
it,142 may provide support to the claim that at least climate-related ESG
information—to the extent that it may have an effect on results, either
by adjusting for or by foreseeing a catastrophic risk—is increasingly
material for investors generally.143
For one, ESG funds seem to have performed better than non-ESG
funds, confirming a trend of better performance in recent precoronavirus years.144 Given that oil prices had plummeted just before the
coronavirus pandemic hit, the relatively better performance of ESG

140. WILLIAMS & FISCH, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting TSC Industries v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
141. Id.
142. Update: Mitigating Securities Litigation Risks Related to the Coronavirus,
PAUL WEISS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/securitieslitigation/publications/update-mitigating-securities-litigation-risks-related-to-thecoronavirus?id=32104 [https://perma.cc/B7N5-3K8K].
143. See Fink, supra note 1; Driving ESG Skywards, supra note 1.
144. Id.; see also Sanghamitra Saha, Zacks, ESG ETFs Appear Unscathed by the
Coronavirus Carnage, YAHOO! FIN. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/
amphtml/news/esg-etfs-appear-unscathed-coronavirus-170005763.html
[https://perma.cc/XU4Y-7Y6S].
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funds might be a result of overall worse performance of funds that have
more investments in the fossil fuel energy industry.145
Additionally, the lack of public health preparedness exposed by the
coronavirus is likely to make the environmental risk of a catastrophic
rise in sea levels146 posed by climate change more present in the minds
of investors.147
In this general vein, the ESG Simplification Disclosure Act broadly
proposes for ESG factors to be considered “de facto” material:148
MATERIALITY.— It is the sense of Congress that ESG metrics, as
such term is defined by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (2),
are de facto material for the purposes of disclosures under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. 149

More recently, on November 13, 2020, the U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) adopted amendments to the “investment duties” regulation
under Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), interpreting that, in order to comply with their fiduciary duties
under ERISA, pension fund managers should consider only “pecuniary”
aspects in determining materiality of ESG considerations—at least for
the purposes of ERISA.150
145. See Imogen Tew, What the Oil Shock Means for ESG Funds, FT ADVISER
(Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.ftadviser.com/investments/2020/03/09/what-the-oil-shockmeans-for-esg-funds [https://perma.cc/8JXP-W5AH].
146. Nate Chumley, Are Securities Laws Effective Against Climate Change?
A Proposal for Targeted Climate Related Disclosure and GHG Reduction, 25
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 155, 178 (2019) (outlining the catastrophe risks posed by
climate change) (citing DAVID REIDMILLER, U.S. GLOBAL RESEARCH PROGRAM, ET AL.,
NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT ch. 2 (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/
chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/F2S6-N8BH]).
147. Bloomberg TV, Taleb Says “White Swan” Coronavirus Was Preventable,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2020-0331/nassim-taleb-says-white-swan-coronavirus-pandemic-was-preventable-video
[https://perma.cc/45N4-XZBL].
148. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong.,
§ 2(b)(3) (2019–2020).
149. Id.
150. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72846, 72848–49
(Nov. 13, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509, 2550) (stating that the purpose of
the action is “to set forth a regulatory structure to assist ERISA fiduciaries in navigating
these ESG investment trends and to separate the legitimate use of risk-return factors
from inappropriate investments that sacrifice investment return, increase costs, or
assume additional investment risk to promote non-pecuniary benefits or objectives.”);
see also TIMOTHY DOYLE, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE “FINANCIAL FACTORS IN
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C. PROPOSALS FOR DISCRETE AND BROAD INCREMENTAL DISCLOSURE
REGULATION
As discussed above, current ESG factors used in voluntary
disclosures can be wide ranging and cover dozens of different items and
subcategories, all of which broadly fall under the environmental, social,
and governance categories.151 Moreover, the material portions of a
company’s disclosure may correspond to one of these factors or
subcategories, and so a one size fits all solution may prove to do little in
the way of better informing investors’ decisions.152
Furthermore, if all private sector initiatives to date, including those
by both rating agencies and market-leading wealth management funds,
have failed to come up with standardized metrics, it may not be realistic
to expect the SEC to be able to “define ESG factors” effectively because
of the complexity this task entails.153
As a result, an incremental approach for mandatory disclosures is
what may be more advisable at this stage. This type of incremental
approach towards mandatory disclosure may take two forms. First, it can
focus on discrete, specific factors. Second, it can focus on all factors
while not settling on a detailed method of line-item disclosures, and
allow investors to decide what material factors may be most relevant or
“material” for investors in their specific industry.
For an example of the first approach, a 2019 student note proposed
targeted climate change disclosure aimed at encouraging green-house
gas reductions.154 Specifically, the note proposed a regulation that would
SELECTING PLAN INVESTMENTS (RIN 1210-AB95)” (July 30, 2020),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-andregulations/public-comments/1210-AB95/00675.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5CU-LTG4]
(explaining that “[w]hile disagreement usually involves how and what to disclose and
to whom,” the central policy debate is “between disclosing ESG issues that are material
in nature and will ultimately impact financial performance, and those used to promote a
social or political agenda, that have not been shown to create value or the value itself is
nonpecuniary.”); Neil Whoriskey, The Department of Labor, ESG and All Those
Undirected Votes, MILBANK GEN. COUNS. BLOG (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.milbankgeneralcounsel.com/2021/01/the-department-of-labor-esg-and-allthose-undirected-votes [https://perma.cc/P7R7-T2CP].
151. See supra Part I.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Chumley, supra note 146, at 155. Undoubtedly, climate change is a leading
factor behind the interest and popularity of ESG initiatives, so starting with this specific
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“mandate[] GHG emissions reduction framework and require[] quarterly
reporting of accurate climate change-related internal data” with an aim
to tracking—and ultimately penalizing—carbon emissions by large
corporations that surpass a certain threshold.155
For an example of the second approach for incremental regulation,
Fisch proposes for the SEC to adopt an additional Regulation S-K
requirement for mandating “Sustainability Discussion and Analysis”
(SD&A), where companies may choose three issues within the wide
ESG factors for mandatory discussion. Fisch’s proposal is modeled after
existing Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) regulations. The
proposal addresses the flexibility that may be required as the SEC enters
an area where agreement on details has proven difficult:156
It is too early to determine the extent to which sustainable business
practices impact economic performance, or the degree to which
boards that engage with sustainability can exercise better risk
management and monitoring. SD&A disclosure represents a valuable
first step that would enable investors and researchers to weigh those
questions with minimal burden on corporate issuers.157

In our opinion, Prof. Fisch’s proposal of an incremental approach
towards mandatory disclosure that allows investors to decide what
factors to address has the additional benefit of providing the SEC with
an opportunity to act now, but in a way that doesn’t stifle
experimentation or the ability to fine-tune the regulation as reporting
practices on ESG continue to evolve.
CONCLUSION
Some form of mandatory ESG disclosure seems to be an impending
reality. While an ESG mandatory disclosure regulation is likely to raise
many implementation issues, and even create new problems, it may also
prove beneficial for a short-term improvement in the efficiency of U.S.
capital markets and corporate governance institutions. The current
factor that falls under the category of “environmental,” would make sense. See Climate
Change Has Made ESG a Force in Investing, ECONOMIST (Dec. 7, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/12/07/climate-change-hasmade-esg-a-force-in-investing [https://perma.cc/9KV9-NZXZ].
155. Chumley, supra note 146, at 179–85.
156. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 966.
157. Id.
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situation of self-regulated and voluntary disclosures that turn into ratings
and metrics which confuse and mislead investors does not seem to be
sustainable in the long term.
As described in this Note, the amount, the nature of and market
demand for ESG information has changed dramatically over the last 25
years to the point that, today, both academics as well as leading market
participants are in agreement that it is time for either Congress or the
SEC to seriously consider making some form of ESG disclosure
mandatory. On the one hand, mandatory disclosures are likely to
eventually lead to standardization and cost reduction for companies
currently making them on a voluntary basis. On the other, they will
increase the stakes and costs to companies that do not currently factor
ESG components in their disclosure analysis. Ultimately, however,
standardization would lead to ESG information becoming more reliable
and actionable, as other forms of SEC-supervised disclosures.
While standardization is desirable, the difficulty of arriving to a
one-size-fits-all rule suggests that the SEC should, at this stage, follow
an incremental approach to regulation. The SEC should either focus on
mandating disclosure on one specific factor, when applicable—for
example, climate change—or allow companies flexibility on deciding
what factors to address and how to address them.

